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I. JUDGE SMITH'S SUBSTANCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW'S PROCESS
In an article published recently in this Journal, Judge Loren Smith
calls for a change in the focus of thinking and writing about administra-
tive law.1 Judge Smith asks that we shift from our dominant concern
over the process of administrative decisionmaking toward a concern over
the substance of administrative action instead.
His article has two themes. Judge Smith first stresses that adminis-
trative action inevitably takes place in a political milieu. Not all admin-
istrative decisions are designed to be acts of political will, freed from
constraints other than political power. But many are, and all administra-
tive decisions must be viewed in the context of larger issues soluble only
by the fiat of subjective political judgment. To lose sight of the political
sea that spawns, defines, and checks administrative activity, Judge Smith
argues, is to mistake the fundamental nature of the administrative
enterprise.
Second, Judge Smith contends that legislators, judges, and commen-
tators who have shaped administrative law in America have made just
this mistake. 2 The story of administrative law told by Judge Smith is the
development of elaborate, court-like procedures for nearly all administra-
tive decisions. The procedures build a record of facts and arguments
upon which decision must be based, thus confining the decisionmaker's
discretion and facilitating judicial supervision. 3 Under this regime, the
rectitude of administrative decisions is tested not by whether they re-
spond to the current political majority, or whether they are intrinsically
good. Rather, the decisions must be made as courts would make them-
they must follow logically from factual predicates established in the deci-
sion process to a single, objectively correct result.4 Judge Smith finds
that, for a broad range of administrative tasks, these court-like proce-
* Professor of Law, Boston University.
1. Smith, Judicialization: The Twilight of Administrative Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 427.
2. See id. at 429-32 (summarizing distinction between "political" and "legal" decisionmaking,
and asserting that modem administrative law fallaciously confuses the two).
3. See id. at 441, 445-47 (discussing how the involvement of more actors in decisionmaking by
creation of a "record" encourages application of creativity-restraining legal processes).
4. See id. at 430.
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dures and associated constraints are incompatible with fidelity to polit-
ical command and inimical to wise resolution of the problems that have
devolved upon administrators. To combat "over-proceduralization,"
Judge Smith sounds the trumpet call for a rediscovery of the moral, polit-
ical and institutional values that ought to be the benchmarks for agency
action.5
There is much in Judge Smith's argument that deserves seconding.
Undeniably, political processes play an enormous role in the creation and
operation of administrative agencies. Equally undeniable is the impor-
tance of understanding that role and of keeping it in mind when discuss-
ing any issue of administrative process. Even a casual perusal of the
volumes in which judges and scholars write reveals ample evidence that
Judge Smith's admonition often goes unheeded. Judges and authors
freely prescribe processes for administrative decisionmaking without ref-
erence to their own normative assumptions and without serious attention
to the political judgments that define the decision to which the proce-
dures will be appled.6 Increasing insulation of administrative decisions
from political influence is a frequent recommendation. 7 Champions of
this approach do not always rest their process recommendation on evi-
dence that the asserted beneficial effects will in fact flow from such
processes, much less on evidence that a political consensus supports
them.8 Argument about process issues more often proceeds from models
of how the administrative process ought to work-models that neither
reflect political consensus, nor rest on fully specified theories.9
Of course, Loren Smith is not the first to argue that American ad-
ministrative processes are "over-judicialized." 10 Judge Smith's article
5. Id. at 466 (urging "fundamental reappraisal of our governmental system," including reeval-
uation of constitutional separation of powers to reflect the modem administrative state).
6. See the discussion in Cass, Allocation of Authority in Bureaucracies: Empirical Evidence
and Normative Analysis, 66 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1986) (forthcoming).
7. See, eg., Davis, Judicialization of Administrative Law: The Trial-Type Hearing and the
Changing Status of the Hearing Officer, 1977 DUKE L.J. 389, 406-08 (discussing "common defi-
ciency" of state and federal administrative procedure reform proposals of allowing political actors
final review over administrative adjudications); Fauver, An Agenda for Investigation: Should the
APA Be Amended to Provide Standards for Agency Review ofAdministrative Trials?, 1973 DUKE L.J.
135, 142-43 (advocating uniform standards for agency review of administrative adjudications); Mar-
zioff, Delay in Review of Initial Decisions: The Case for Giving More Finality to the Findings of Fact
of the Administrative Law Judge, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 393, 416-17 (1978) (urging that, because
of ALI's greater legal expertise, political impartiality, and limits on agency time and objectivity, AUl
findings of fact should not be reversed upon agency review unless "clearly erroneous").
8. See Cass, supra note 6.
9. See Cass, Models of Administrative Action, 72 VA. L. REv. 363 (1986).
10. See, eg., Pops, The Judicialization of Federal Administrative Law Judges: Implications for
Policymaking, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 169, 205-06 (1979); Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco: A Reprise, 47 U. CHi.
L. REv. 57 (1979) (arguing that appointment and promotion procedures for ALJs prevent efficiency
in administrative adjudication). For a discussion of the problems of judicial intrusion into institu-
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cites some of the prior literature and aptly notes that several related ar-
guments share the judicialization concern, arguments against the power
of judges, against trial-type procedures, against costly, complex proce-
dures in general." Judge Smith adds to these his own synthesis: all of
these complaints about administrative law are right; the currently domi-
nant approach to administrative law is wrong; process should serve sub-
stance; and substance should be grounded in the political judgments that
properly shape and reflect popular consensus. 12
Attractive though these general themes are, in developing them
Judge Smith passes much too quickly over two important points: the
difficulty of arriving at political consensus, and the importance to polit-
ical consensus of exactly those processes to which Smith objects. When,
in accordance with Judge Smith's plea, we turn to substantive concerns
as the touchstone of administrative law, we immediately confront intrac-
table problems in defining what constitutes "good" government and in
selecting mechanisms to ensure its accomplishment. While these
problems are common to all areas of public law, 13 they are particularly
troublesome for administrative law, which attempts to prescribe deci-
sionmaking processes for the full range of government bureaucracies.
These problems do not compel a return to the concepts of administrative
process that trouble Judge Smith. They do, however, limit how far we
can move from current concerns and structures.
II. THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL GOOD
The first problem necessarily posed by our search for substantive
guidance is selecting the principles to guide social choice. 14 Yet the solu-
tion to this first problem is impeded by the diversity of private choice
orderings; differences as to what we want, what we would give to get it,
and under what circumstances, frustrate both efforts to select outcomes
for society and efforts to select principles for social choice. Group deci-
sionmaking is not simply individual decisionmaking writ large. Individu-
tional decisionmaking, see generally Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending
Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 77-106 (1979).
11. Smith, supra note 1, at 428-29.
12. Id. at 429-32.
13. See, eg., Cass, The Meaning of Liberty: Notes on Problems Within the Fraternity, I NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 777 (1985) (discussing approaches to interpretation of "liberty" in
the Constitution).
14. See, eg., J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 250-52 (3d ed.
1950); Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POL. EcoN. 23 (1948) (implying, in
assumption that each member of decisionmaking group can rank options in order of preference so
that the orderings are comparable, that some common principles of choice have been reached);
Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV. 164 (1958).
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als may make decisions they later regret because the benefit derived from
an activity was less or the cost greater than anticipated.15 As a general
rule, however, we trust individuals to decide which among many possible
options for activity each will take.16 Each individual gathers, assesses,
and acts upon information according to his or her skills and preferences.
There seldom is a need to articulate the principles that inform individual
choices or the mechanics by which those decisions are made. Although
these principles and mechanisms may be of intense interest, respectively,
to philosophers and psychologists, for most purposes of social interaction
we are willing to accept each private order of choices as a given, irrespec-
tive of the nature of the order or the manner in which it was fashioned.1 7
When social, rather than individual, choices are involved, some or-
der of preference must be selected for decisions affecting more than one
person. Making this selection is simple only in the extremely unlikely
event that all persons concerned share identical preferences. The notion
of "Pareto efficiency" extracted from the work of Vilfredo Pareto ele-
gantly addresses a subset of situations that come close to this shared-
preference state, suggesting that social decisions are proper if at least one
person is benefitted and no one harmed. 8 The more likely case for a
collective decision, however, is that for any contemplated action some
persons will believe they are made better off while others will believe they
are made worse off. Whenever that situation arises, a principle must be
found that permits collective decisionmaking to benefit some persons at
the expense of others. Put differently, unless all concerned concur as to
which choices are good and which bad, some definition of collective good
15. See March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice, 9 BELL J.
EcON. 587, 593-605 (1978) (indeterminacy of future human preferences, as well as human limita-
tions in foreseeing future consequences of actions, inject uncertainty into efficiency of human
decisionmaking).
16. While we impose certain restraints-such as competency and majority-on our faith in
individual orderings of choice, paternalistic intervention in people's affairs is in twentieth-century
America almost universally viewed as being suited only to unusual circumstances; it is the exception,
not the rule. See Regan, Justifications for Paternalism, in NoMos XV: THE LIMITS OF LAW 189 (J.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1974).
17. How these private choices then are treated-favored or disfavored-by legal rules is, of
course, a separate issue. See, eg., Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-
Term Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1985) (reluctance of courts to adjust private contracts when
changed circumstances reduce value of the choice ordering to one party); see also Burt, Commentary
on Schelling's "Enforcing Rules on Oneself" I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 381 (1985); Schelling, Enforcing
Rules on Oneself 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 357 (1985) (discussing degree to which private choice order-
ings are inherently binding on individual will).
18. See V. PARETO, MANUEL D'EONOMIE POLITIQUE (2d ed. 1927). Pareto's ideal is usefully
discussed in many works, including Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HoF-





The definition of collective good has been a task pursued over the
years by philosophers, economists, political scientists, and lawyers,
among others. Despite attention from a considerable number of
respected thinkers, no definition has gained consensus. The attempts to
crack this chestnut may be grouped in two classes: (1) those seeking to
guide action by articulated "first principles,"' 20 and (2) those looking to
some aggregation of individual choices for guidance. 21
Even a lengthy book could not do justice to the group of proposals
for defining the social good according to first principles. It is sufficient
for present purposes to note that all such proposals founder at a common
point: each depends on collective acquiescence in the proponent's views
and values. First principles are not logical deductions from empirical
evidence; they are not testable hypotheses. Rather, they are more or less
scrupulous elaborations of the proponent's own preferences, and their
acceptance consequently depends on the cultural heritage and current
circumstances of their audience.22 In other words, to the extent first
principles embody shared notions of good they will be embraced; to the
extent they do not, they will be rejected. 23 Absent universal acceptance
of a principle (within the relevant decisionmaking universe), the question
19. See A. SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE, AND MEASUREMENT 341 (1982) [hereinafter A. SEN,
CHOICE]; Ramachandra, Liberalism, Non-binary Choice and Pareto Principle, 3 THEORY & DECI-
SION 49 (1972); Sager, supra note 13. See also A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WEL-
FARE 83-85 (1979) (offering a normative critique of the Pareto principle) [hereinafter A. SEN,
COLLECTIVE CHOICE]. Unanimity, of course, is possible without shared preferences if the decision
to be made is structured in a particular fashion and individuals with divergent preferences agree that
one of the possible choices is preferable to any other. Note, too, that the definition of collective good
necessary where unanimous choice is not reached may take substantive or procedural form.
20. See, eg., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971).
21. See, eg., K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); R. DAHL,
A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); Bergson, A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Wel-
fare Economics, 52 Q.J. ECON. 310 (1938).
22. The rich literature critiquing the work of John Rawls, supra note 20, often makes this
point. See, eg., A. SEN, CHOICE, supra note 19, at 135-41; Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian
Notes on Rawls's Theory of Justice, 70 J. PHIL. 245, 252-55 (1973); Hare, Rawls' Theory of Justice, 23
PHIL. Q. 144 (1973), reprinted in READING RAWLS 81 (N. Daniel ed. 1974); Nagel, Rawls on Jus-
tice, 82 PHIL. REV. 220 (1973), reprinted in READING RAWLS, supra at 1.
23. See, e.g., Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of
John Rawls's Theory, 69 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 594, 602 (1975) (doubting applicability of Rawls's
theory because rigid first principles incapable of doing justice to complex moral problems); Hart,
Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 534, 545 (1973) (questioning result, under
Rawls's acceptance of liberty as first principle, when people differ as to value of conflicting liberties),
reprinted in READING RAWLS, supra note 22, at 230. Other principles such as those variously
proposed by Robert Nozick, Charles Fried, Ronald Dworkin, and Roberto Unger have been criti-
cized on similar grounds. See, eg., A. SEN, CHOICE, supra note 19, at 306-07 (critiquing an aspect
of R. NoZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974)).
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remains as to why non-believers should acquiesce in decisionmaking
guided by that principle. That proponents of first principles, like adher-
ents to particular religions, have faith in the rightness of their principles
is no answer-and at the same time is the only answer to this question.
The second class of principles for social ordering frequently is
presented as an alternative that avoids the necessity for the Kierkegaar-
dian leap of faith24 on which principles of the first class depend.25 The
argument is that by aggregating individual values we allow each individ-
ual's preferences to play a role in arriving at the collective decision. True
as this is, of itself this faith in the aggregation of individual choices con-
stitutes a first principle subject to contravention by all whose theology of
public decisionmaking diverges.
Putting that objection aside, we encounter a second difficulty: some
means must be devised for aggregating diverse individual views. Inevita-
bly this calls for another choice among first principles.
One could, in line with some notions of democracy, count un-
weighted plusses and minuses, each person casting one yes or no vote on
every issue. This mechanism has the benefit of theoretical simplicity; one
need only identify the relevant participants, define the issue in a fashion
permitting binary tabulation, and provide a vehicle for registering indi-
vidual votes. Of course, for some issues, defining the relevant partici-
pants and framing the issue in a manner suitable for resolution proves
difficult, 26 and there is evidence that the order in which issues are consid-
ered as well as the way in which they are framed may influence results.27
Moreover, it is possible for individual choices to be ordered in a manner
such that use of the "democratic choice model" and the seriatim voting
process results in defeat for any proposed action on a given issue despite
the preference of each voter for action over inaction.28
The democratic model is also criticized for failing to take into ac-
24. See S. KIERKEGAARD, AFSLUTTENDE UVIDENSKABELIG EFERSKRIFT (Copenhagen
1846) (published in English as CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTCRIPT (1941)).
25. See, eg., Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980); Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory,
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 110-11 (1979).
26. See D. BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMrITEES AND ELECTIONS 146-47 (1958) (discussing
compromise and obstinacy in international negotiation); W. RIKER & P. ORDESHOOK, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO POsrrIvE POLIT:CAL THEORY 78-115 (1973).
27. E.g., Levine & Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561 (1977);
McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda
Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472 (1976).
28. See, e.g., D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 38-49 (1979) (reviewing the literature on "cy-
cling" under majority rule-that is, the result that when committees are free to redefine the issues
proposed, the losers have such high incentives to become part of a winning coalition that the major-
ity shifts in an endless cycle, preventing nonarbitrary choice of winner).
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count the different intensities of individual preferences.29 A minority of
voters intensely interested in an issue may value outcome A a great deal
more than the relatively disinterested majority values outcome B. If we
look to individual values to dictate social choices, why rely solely on the
number of voters to favor one result rather than on the value those voters
place on that and alternative results? Were negotiation among the group
members possible, it is more likely that value-weighted votes would re-
flect consensus than that a majority of unweighted votes would.30
If, however, the differing intensity of individual interests is to be
taken into account, yet another hurdle is presented. By what metric is
intensity of interest to be judged? A substantial body of literature is de-
voted to analyzing the difficulties of making interpersonal utility com-
parisions.31 The only convenient medium for indicating intensity of
interest is money; but there is considerable basis for doubt that different
people with different amounts of money place the same value on it.32
Indeed, discomfort with a "market choice model" premised on dollar-
weighted votes may provide the chief impetus for reversion to the demo-
cratic choice model.33
III. PRINCIPLES AND PROCESS: PROBLEMS IN TRANSLATION
Lack of consensus as to a principle for public decisionmaking per-
meates all discussions of public action. Were such consensus achieved,
however, there still would be difficulty making the decisionmaking pro-
cess conform to the principle. Agreement on a general choice principle
does not completely eliminate the divergence among private preferences
for outcomes.
29. E.g., Stigler, Economic Competition and Political Competition, 13 PuB. CHOICE 91 (1972).
30. E.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 119-98, 211-22 (1962);
A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 187-88 (1957). For general discussions of this
aspect of collective action, see M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); W. RIKER,
THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962).
31. See, eg., L. ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCI-
ENCE 138 (2d ed. 1935); A. SEN, CHOICE, supra note 19, at 203-21; Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare,
Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309, 316-21
(1955); Samuelson, Reaffirming The Existence of "Reasonable" Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare
Functions, 44 ECONOMICA 81 (1977).
32. See G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 51-52 (3d ed. 1966) (discussing "indifference
curve" of diminishing marginal utility as quantity of commodity increases); Sen, Personal Utilities
and Public Judgements: Or What's Wrong With Welfare Economics?, 89 ECON. J. 537 (1979).
33. See, e-g., Blum, The Divisible First Amendment: 4 Critical Functionalist Approach to Free-
dom of Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1273, 1369-78 (1983); Frug,
The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1276, 1373-77 (1984); Wright,
Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982).
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Principles of the first class are dependent either on universal assent
and uniform interpretation or on the coercive power of the principle's
proponents. The former is extremely unlikely to occur. Even if all
agreed that social decisions should, for instance, maximize benefits to the
worst-off class, 34 itself an improbable outcome, agreement on who is
worst-off, how class boundary lines should be drawn, and what choice
among several alternatives maximizes benefits to that class would be for-
tuitous. 35 Agreement on such ambiguous principles as this "maximin"
rule, or on propositions such as "America should have a strong econ-
omy," is an insufficient basis for public decisionmaking. Rather, the
agreement must extend to relatively detailed determinations derivable
from the initial substantive principle. Absent universal concurrence as to
the principle's legitimacy and meaning, its utility as a vehicle for control-
ling public actions must rest on the coercive power of whatever group
does agree on those points. Further, the absence of universal assent,
while necessitating coercive power, also provides a variety of vehicles for
compromising and mitigating the coercive power visited upon the dis-
senting groups by the orthodoxy.36
The second group of principles also loses something in translation.
The democratic choice model faces serious impediments best captured by
Professor Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem: democratic decisions
that meet certain basic criteria are not derivable from any process free
from arbitrary or undemocratic constraints on social choice.37 Even if
we are willing to credit whatever choice emerges from decisions that are
affected by agenda-setting and other constraints, devising the appropriate
choice mechanism is problematic. The sheer size of the polity and
34. See J. RAWLS, supra note 20, at 152-57.
35. See, ag., D. MUELLER, supra note 28, at 239-41; Hart, supra note 23; Klevorick, Discus-
sion, 64 AM. EcON. REV. 158 (1974).
36. See, eg., H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 332-42 (1968) (in context
of criminal sanctions for behavior (drug use) for which consensus as to external harm is lacking).
37. K. ARROW, supra note 21, at 22-60. Professor Arrow imposes upon the construction of a
social welfare function five "reasonable" conditions generally embodying doctrines of citizens' sover-
eignty and rationality: (1) all logically possible orderings are obtainable from the admissible set of
individual choice orderings; (2) the social ordering will respond positively or nonnegatively (i.e.,
increasing or not decreasing welfare) to alterations in individual values; (3) the choices from a fixed
environment of alternatives are independent of alternatives outside that environment; (4) social
choice is not to be imposed upon individuals (i.e., no external constraint on social choice); and (5)
social choice shall be nondictatorial (i.e., no internal domination). Id. at 22-33. Professor Arrow
then determines that a social welfare function satisfying all five conditions leads to a contradiction,
and concludes that satisfactory social welfare orderings must compromise one or more of these dem-
ocratic conditions. Id. at 46-60.
The criteria Arrow chooses and the significance of the results he obtains are discussed helpfully
in A. MACKAY, ARROW's THEOREM: THE PARADOX OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1980) (combining, for
discussion purposes, the fourth and fifth conditions); D. MUELLER, supra note 28, at 185-206; A.
SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE, supra note 19, at 35-55.
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number of public choices to be made imposes the first constraint: every-
one's preference cannot, except at insuperable cost, be registered on each
matter for which some collective choice is made.38 As choices are dele-
gated and issues subject to direct voter decision are bundled, decisions
will deviate from the democratic choice model's ideal, even assuming
that delegates uniformly attempt to divine and effectuate majority prefer-
ences. Accurate information about voter preferences on particular issues
cannot easily (at low cost) be had, and the results of delegate elections
provide scant guidance on most issues.39 More significantly, the incen-
tives of the delegate diverge from uniform implementation of majority
preferences, and this divergence increases with the number of decisions
made by the delegate, the number of voters the delegate represents, and
the heterogeneity of voter outlook.4°
In large measure, the reason for this is the disparate intensity of
voters' interest in different issues. As noted earlier, a normative objection
to the democratic model is that it should reflect intensities of prefer-
ences.41 Beyond that, a practical objection is that choice mechanisms in
fact must reflect such intensities. It is difficult to keep people from acting
as though how much they care about an issue matters. In implicit and
explicit vote-trading, in lobbying and other devices for influencing public
decisions, people will reflect the intensity of their interest in specific mat-
ters, and delegates will respond.42 One response will be to delegate deci-
sionmaking authority further 43-and each additional delegation
decreases the decisionmaker's incentives to ascertain and implement ma-
jority preferences.
The market choice model faces similar difficulties. The attempt to
maximize social value through the use of payment mechanisms meets a
familiar series of practical objections: under-provision of public goods,
free-rider problems in influencing decisions, unequal transaction costs in
influencing decisions.44 Consider, for example, a contest over a proposed
38. See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 30, at 68-69, 88-96.
39. See Stigler, supra note 29.
40. See . BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 30, at 109-16; W. RIKER & P. ORDESHOOK,
supra note 26, at 360-70.
41. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
42. See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 30, at 55-60; M. OLSON, supra note 30, at
141-43; Barro, The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, 14 PUB. CHOICE 19 (1973); Riker &
Brains, The Paradox of Vote Trading, 67 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1235 (1973).
43. See, eg., Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 24-26, 30-37 (1982); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 211 (1976); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sc. 3
(1971).
44. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS (1968); A. FELD-
MAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 89-210 (1980); R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA,
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shopping mall. The cost of building the mall in diminished value of sur-
rounding property may exceed its value. But if the value of the mall's
benefit is captured by the developer, while its cost is spread across 2,000
nearby homeowners, the cost of aggregating funds for the pro-mall posi-
tion will be much less than the cost of aggregating the value of the anti-
mall position, and distortion in the data for making the social choice will
result. If government is asked to make decisions when asymmetric trans-
action costs make the economic market an imperfect guarantor of social
value, the same problems exist. Government decisionmakers might well
be instructed to act as surrogates for the zero-cost market, but, absent an
obvious market choice, the impediments to revealing the true dollar votes
in the market will produce similar distortions in government action. In-
stead 'of a market distortion because of unequal costs in aggregating
funds to bid for the property, the result will be a distorted public decision
because of unequal costs in aggregating funds to influence the govern-
ment decisionmaker (e.g., through lobbying). The same impediments to
perfectly functioning markets impair perfect market choice gov-
ernment.45
Whichever principle for social choice one finds desirable, the imple-
mentation is difficult. The difficulty in each case reflects the underlying
difference of opinions regarding social choice. We do not have uniform
desires and values. No verbal formula will make that fact disappear. No
principle that attempts to evade the ultimate resolution of these underly-
ing differences can produce a yardstick easily applied to observable data.
And without such a yardstick, the procedures designed to implement
such a principle never can fully succeed.46
Frustrated by the inability to tailor processes that can be trusted to
give effect to a principle, commentators often seek refuge in authority. It
is tempting to posit the existence of an overseer who will spot and reverse
deviations from the principle selected. But the suggestion, while tempt-
ing, is fatuous. Although many commentators, myself included, will
GAMES AND DECISIONS (1957); Head, Public Goods and Public Policy, 17 PUB. FIN. 197 (1962);
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON.
233 (1979).
45. See, e.g., G. TULLOCK, PRIVATE WANTS, PUBLIC MEANS (1970); Goetz & McKnew, Para-
doxical Results in a Public Choice Model of Alternative Government Grant Forms, in THEORY OF
PUBLIC CHOICE 224 (J. Buchanan & R. Tollison eds. 1972); Posner, Theories of Economic Regula-
tion, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974); Stigler, Free Riders and Collective Action: An
Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MOMT. SCI. 359 (1974).
46. See, eg., A. SEN, CHOICE, supra note 19, at 41-73, 226-58; Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REv. 387 (1981) (noting implicit value judgments
in liberal Pareto superiority analyses, and indeterminacy of such analyses when stripped of value
judgment); Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 25-39
(1984) (arguing that legal discourse generally fails to resolve contradictory value choices).
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argue that a given result diverges from a particular principle, the diver-
gence inevitably is judged by the commentator's own lights. The absence
of simple, easily applied, substantive principles precludes agreement that
a principle has been violated.47 Any attempt to construct mechanisms to
control public decisionmaking thus is hampered by the very difficulty
that prompted the attempt to control the decisionmaker: the difficulty of
ascertaining departures from the ideal.48
IV. RE-CONSTITUTING THE PROCESS DEBATE
Judge Smith's call for attention to substantive concerns, for the crea-
tion of "a coherent rationale for a system of order, justice, and liberty," 49
does not bring us back to a simple, accepted, but temporarily forgotten
notion of the public good. Instead, it forces us to confront the uncom-
fortable fact that no such notion exists. Without it, we limp along-or,
as Professor Lindbolm put it, muddle through-50-trying to find "second-
best" criteria to guide our social choices. The intractability of the
problems of selecting and implementing principles for public decision-
making does not mean that there are no criteria for judging the propriety
of governmental action. It does mean that no criteria are free from seri-
ous dispute and that no judgment about their application is free from
contravention.
The enterprise Judge Smith would have us undertake-to root ad-
ministrative law in substantive principle-thus should not be seen as a
search for a truly coherent rationale, a principle of global application.
Rather, it is the search for partial, usable, but ultimately indefinite crite-
ria to guide decisions. These second-best criteria take a variety of forms.
Most often, they are combinations of half-formed principles and more-
fully specified procedures.
The move from idiosyncratic, comprehensive principles to more
broadly accepted, partial guides, then, also moves us away from sub-
stance and toward process. Judge Smith implicitly recognizes this-he
repeatedly invokes the constitutional framework of our government as
the base referent in which arguments about administrative law should be
grounded.51 The Constitution, our sacred legal-governmental text, does
47. See Lef, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1241 (if each individ-
ual's ethical conclusions are unassailable, conflict is inevitable; only if some agreement on ethical
evaluation is possible may conflict be avoided).
48. See, eg., Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110, 1164-79
(1981); Cass, supra note 6.
49. Smith, supra note 1, at 466.
50. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PuB. AD. REv. 79 (1959).
51. E.g., Smith, supra note 1, at 447-50, 457-59.
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contain substantive guidance, providing a mix of first principles in differ-
ent provisions and amendments.5 2 Its main concerns, however, are those
of process. Unable to agree on substantive outcomes for known issues or
to foresee many future issues, the framers prescribed procedures for
resolving various arguments.5 3 The focus of the Constitution, thus, is not
entirely supportive of Judge Smith's plea for less concern with process
and more with the substance of government action. Moreover, the pro-
cedures set out in the Constitution provide much less help in resolving
issues of inter-branch competence than Judge Smith appears to believe
and provide less support for some of his views than he would like.
The principal lesson Smith draws from the Constitution is a familiar
one: the basic judgments of our society are to be made by politicians
through political processes.54 From this, Judge Smith intimates, we can
deduce the secondary lesson: that judges and judicial processes should
play a much smaller role than they now do. The theme on which Smith
plays is heard frequently in arguments over the appropriate allocation of
decisional authority.5 5 The appeal to nonjudicial, democratic processes
52. See, eg., Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 361-67 (1981) (dis-
cussing theory that Constitution contains both particularized provisions to be applied strictly, and
more general provisions to be interpreted in light of modem conditions); Schauer, Must Speech Be
Special?, 78 Nv. U.L. REV. 1284, 1305-06 (1983) (the fact that freedom of speech is singled out for
protection by Constitution indicates underlying principle that speech is "special" relative to other
liberties); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J.
1063, 1065-67 (1980).
53. See, eg., Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of The States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954) (constitu-
tional procedures designed to accommodate coexistence of states and national government as sepa-
rate entities).
The dominance of process in the "answers" given by the federal Constitution is plain. What to
make of it has been the source of controversy. Some commentators have essayed to build coherent
theories of constitutional adjudication around particular process concerns. E.g., J. CHOPER, JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLrrICAL PROCEss: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Other
scholars have stressed the limits of this approach. See, eg., Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34
STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982) (critique of Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739
(1982)); Lupu, Choosing Heroes Carefully, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 779 (1980) (reviewing J.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRuST (1980)); Tribe, supra note 45, at 1067-68 (stressing substantive
basis of procedural norms); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart
Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
The debate over just how much of constitutional adjudication can be decided by reference to
process concerns underscores the point relevant here: the substantive moral grounding Judge Smith
seeks may be important to resolve many issues of constitutional interpretation, but the process issues
he would deemphasize are the central focus of constitutional discourse.
54. See Smith, supra note 1, at 430.
55. See, eg., L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 66-74 (1958); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2-3, 5-6, 10-11 (1971); Monaghan, supra note 45, at 370-
71; Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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as the normal procedures for social decisionmaking is useful because, like
motherhood and apple pie, everyone feels comfortable with the concept.
Like the other staple goods, however, there is less agreement on how
much is enough. Surely, the Constitution reposes power principally in
the political branches.5 6 Just as surely, the Constitution evidences little
faith in politicians and political processes. At every turn, the document
displays concern over what politicians, political associations, and polit-
ical processes might do. 57 In large measure, these concerns are reflected
in the division of authority among political bodies. The federal govern-
ment is not omnipotent (not, at least, in the written Constitution), but
must share power with the states.58 Within the federal government, the
President, Senate, and House are constituted to reflect the views of dispa-
rate constituencies, each body in some measure checking the others.5 9
Within each legislative house, the constitutionally-authorized rules of
procedure further divide political power.60 Finally, unless one is pre-
pared to roll the clock back nearly two centuries and re-argue Marbury, 61
the courts must be given a place of some importance in the constitutional
scheme. The Constitution spells out substantive federal limits on the
political branches' authority, and courts-the most insular, apolitical
decisionmaking bodies in America-are entrusted with the obligation to
see that those limits are respected. 62
56. See, ag., A. BICKEL, THE MORALrrY OF CONSENT (1975); Hart, The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953).
The debates over the Constitution leave no doubt where the locus of power was thought to be. See
M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 69-195 (1913) (de-
bates predominantly concerned scope and contours of federal legislative and executive power); THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 491 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961) ("ihe judiciary is beyond compar-
ison the weakest of the three departments of power .... "),
57. The different facets of this concern have been explored in numerous works, among them:
THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 47, 48 (J. Madison), 51, 63, 68 & 78 (A. Hamilton); Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); Wellington, The Nature of Judicial
Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486 (1982) (discussing role of countermajoritarian safeguards in judicial inter-
pretation of Constitution and statutes).
58. This understanding was made explicit in U.S. CONST. amend. X.
59. Thus, in the original constitutional scheme, members of the two legislative houses and the
President were chosen by three different electoral processes, from constituencies differently con-
figured, and at different times. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3; id., art. II, § 1.
60. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 2. The effect of various rules for procedure and committee
assignment is discussed in a voluminous literature. See, e.g., R. ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE
BUREAUCRACY (1979); R. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES (1973); D. MAYHEW, CON-
GRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974); Plott, Some Organizational Influences on Urban Re-
newal Decisions, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 306 (1968); Ritt, Committees Position, Seniority and the
Distribution of Government Expenditures, 24 PUB. POL'Y 463 (1976).
61. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
62. Indeed, among the welter of competing views on constitutional interpretation, this is one of
very few points of agreement. See Cass, supra note 13, at 778-90 and works discussed therein. The
term "substantive" in the text above is not used to distinguish constraints divorced from process
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The point often is made that judicial control of public decisions is an
anomaly in our constitutional scheme.63 That point, while instinctively
appealing, is sustained by belief and not by logic: the courts' exercise of
authority becomes suspect only when extended beyond their proper
realm, and defining that realm is, of course, exactly the issue.64 If the
case is to be made that courts have intruded too far into the domains of
other branches of government, it is necessary to spell out those respective
domains with some precision.
Separating the sphere of decisionmaking appropriate to any of the
branches of government from that properly left to the other branches
long has been problematic. Every attempt to draw clear boundaries
within the federal government and between federal and state authority
has failed. The rise and fall of the limited commerce clause,65 Lochner-
style substantive due process, 66 the nondelegation doctrine,67 and Na-
tional League of Cities' insulation of traditional state functions from fed-
eral predation 6s are some of the more visible examples of this
phenomenon. Similarly, the effort to define executive functions, as dis-
tinct from legislative or judicial functions, in aid of explicating the inter-
branch division of appointment and removal powers, has taken courts on
an unsteady journey from Myers 69 and Humphrey's Executor70 to Buck-
ley v. Valeo 71 and the judicial attack on Gramm-Rudman.72 Even INS v.
concerns from constraints that arguably arise from concern over process defects. See, eg., Sager,
Rights Skepticism and Process-Based Responses, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 417 (1981); Sandalow, The Dis-
trust of Politics, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 446 (1981).
63. E.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEASr DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962); L. HAND, supra note 55,
at 66-74; Bork, supra note 55, at 8 (choice of "fundamental values" by Court not justifiable); Wechs-
ler, supra note 55, at 2-20.
64. See Cass, supra note 13, at 788 (simple majority goverance preference misleading; but nar-
rower form of preference is unhelpful in resolving roles of legislature and court); Sager, supra note
62, at 442 (Constitution too complex to assume a simple underlying value of majoritarianism).
65. Compare Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), and United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941), with Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), and Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918).
66. Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), and Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934), with Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), and Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See generally McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court:
An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. Cr. REv. 34.
67. Compare FCC v. RCA Communications, 346 U.S. 86 (1953), and Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414 (1944), with Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and Pan-
ama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
68. Compare Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985), with
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
69. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
70. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
71. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Part IV of the Court's opinion in Buckley, id. at 109-43, declared that
the members of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) performed functions that could be classified
under four different headings: those in aid of legislation, those that were themselves quasi-legislative,
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Chadha,73 which Judge Smith gingerly praises as a step away from
judicialization and toward "true congressional policy oversight," 74
reveals the difficulty of efforts to separate the arena of one branch from
that of another: if Congress can authorize executive officials to make
policy with little or no real guidance, why cannot Congress retain a rela-
tively low-cost check-the legislative veto-over that policymaking pro-
cess? Declaring the act "legislative" or "executive" may convey the
speaker's decision, but it does not present a clear reason derived from
explicit constitutional principle.75
It should not be surprising that these efforts to resolve separation-of-
function issues seem more the products of intuition than of logical deri-
vation from definite premises: the Constitution simply does not provide
clear guidance on these problems-at least not at the "edges" where the
issues arise. The legislative and executive branches both have roles to
play with respect to most governmental functions, and the roles are not
sharply distinguished in the text. The roles are not, of course, entirely
interchangable; one does get a feel for the different behavior expected of
these branches. The point, however, is that all one has in this area is
feeling, and feelings about what legislators and administrators should be
doing inevitably differ.76
So it is with defining the judicial role. Judges differ from legislators
and administrators more than other officials diverge one from the
those that were quasi-judicial, and those, such as initiating enforcement actions, that were executive.
Only the first function clearly could be delegated to agents of the legislature, and the last function
clearly had to be performed by "Officers of the United States" under U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
The Constitution requires these officers to be appointed presidentially (with senatorial consent) or
administratively (by Department heads). The Court therefore found the legislative involvement in
the appointment of FEC members unconstitutional. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140.
72. Bowsher v. Synar, 54 U.S.L.W. 5064 (1986) (finding the delegation of certain powers to the
Comptroller General under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act (formally titled
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037
(1985)) unconstitutional given the executive nature of the functions in issue and the previously
adopted legislation authorizing congressional participation in removal (for cause) of the
Comptroller).
73. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding legislative veto provision of Immigration and Nationality Act
unconstitutional).
74. Smith, supra note I, at 451 (emphasis in original). Judge Smith does immediately observe
that Chadha might be regarded from different vantage points either as increasing or decreasing
judicialization of administrative law. See id. at 451 n.81 (explaining that by "true congressional
policy oversight" the author does not mean reversal of particular executive decisions or review of
regulatory and procedural minutiae).
75. See Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Leg-
islative Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 125, 131-47; Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathiwater? 4
Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789, 794-801.
76. Compare Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 43, with Mashaw, Prodelegation:
Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985).
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other.77 But defining how courts should reach decisions, what principles
they should employ to implement the Constitution, or how much they
should defer to legislators and administrators is no easier than separating
legislative from administrative functions. Judges and scholars in consti-
tutional and administrative law have fought over these lines for years in a
manner reminiscent of the First World War's Western Front: using all
the resources at their command, the combatants emerge from their
trenches, gain or lose a few yards, settle into new trenches, reemerge for
another fight, and usually end the second skirmish close to their original
positions.78
The vagueness of the substantive constitutional provisions most
often at issue-their text, history, and motivating principles are all sub-
ject to conflicting construction in substantial measure 79-ineluctably
leads to debate over the role courts play in constitutional adjudication,
and similar problems pervade statutory adjudication.80 How far does the
due process clause tie the government's hands in structuring procedures
for terminating welfare benefits or government employment?81 Does the
77. Judges, even where elected, are insulated from many forces that operate relatively freely on
other government actors, and respond to incentives that have little impact on other government
decisionmakers. See, eg., B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); Fuller,
The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 365, 381-93 (1978); Landes & Pos-
ner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
78. See, eg., Cass, supra note 13, at 778-90; Brest, supra note 53; Greenawalt, The Enduring
Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 982 (1978); Grey, The Constitution as Scrip-
ture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984); Lupu, Constitutional Theory and the Search for the Workable
Premise, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 579 (1983) (deploring academic "inbreeding" in recent constitu-
tional theory); Monaghan, supra note 52, at 361-74; Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language,
29 UCLA L. REV. 797, 812-21 (1982); Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1502, 1503-08 (1985) (tracing formalist-antiformalist debate over role of judicial
review in constitutional law).
79. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204
(1980); Schauer, Authority and Indeterminacy, in NoMos XXIX: AUTHORITY REVISITED (J. Pen-
nock & J. Chapman eds. 1987) (forthcoming); Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regula-
tion: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212 (1983) (speech
interacts with society in too complex a manner for adequate single theory of first amendment to
exist); Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537, 559-96 (1982).
80. See, eg., G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (proposing
that courts undertake to update obsolete statutes, as they behave toward obsolete precedent); Diver,
Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 551-67 (1985) (describ-
ing role of competing independent theories of interpretation of statutes delegating authority to agen-
cies); Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEx. L. REV. 527 (1982); Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains,
50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1983) (discussing means of determining whether a statute is applicable, as
logically preliminary question to construction of statute); Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Inter-
pretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 551 (1982); Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial
Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REv. 213 (1983) (comment on G. CALA-
BRESI, supra).
81. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985); Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341 (1976); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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Constitution command a judicial remedy for uncompensated government
interference with private rights?8 2 How much authority does the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act grant the NLRB to interpret its own statu-
tory mandate?83 Without clear and easy answers to questions such as
these, it is naive to think that agreement can be reached as to the right
amount of judicial intrusion into government decisionmaking. Courts af-
firm the overwhelming majority of administrative decisions that come
before them. 84 Judge Smith, among others, would have the percentage of
affirmances rise still more; other commentators express the opposite pref-
erence.85 There is little basis for belief that any clear ground for resolu-
tion of this difference awaits discovery if only we will look for it.
This does not condemn us to the ultra-realist view of law as deter-
mined only by what the judge ate for breakfast.8 6 Even without clear
principles and easy answers, there are some matters on which consensus
emerges. If the hard cases argued about in law school still elude solution,
some cases in nearly every substantive area nonetheless have become
easy.8 7 No one today will argue seriously that criminal punishment for
criticism of the incumbent administration, or exclusion of blacks or Jews
from government service, could pass constitutional muster.
For many inquiries, even when substantive consensus remains elu-
sive, consensus does emerge on the appropriate decisionmaking process.
As with substantive problems, difficult issues remain, but there often is
general agreement on certain paradigm cases. For creation of everyday
positive law, as for Constitution-making, procedural consensus fre-
quently is achieved more readily than substantive concord. In some mea-
sure, process agreement is easier than substantive agreement because
82. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
83. See NLRB v. Financial Inst. Employees, Local 1182, 106 S. Ct. 1007 (1986); NLRB v.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 105 S. Ct. 3045 (1985); NLRB v. Action Automotive, Inc., 105
S. Ct. 984 (1985); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
84. See Robinson, The Judicial Role, in COMMUNICATIONS FOR TOMORROW 415, 443 (G.
Robinson ed. 1978) (finding an eighty percent affirmance rate for FCC decisions during a time of
perceived judicial activism on communications policy issues); see also Gardner, Federal Courts and
Agencies: An Audit of the Partnership Books, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 800 (1975) (empirical examination
of judicial review of agency decisions in 1974; agencies affirmed in sixty-five percent of cases, appar-
ent deference accorded agency determinations in fifty-two percent of cases).
85. E.g., Frug, supra note 33. See also Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1982) (advocating greater judicial inquiry into a class of administrative
actions where public values are at stake); Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983
Sup. Cr. REV. 177 (same). Cf Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Ration-
ality Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 487 (1979) (similar argument with respect to constitutional
review of legislation).
86. Eg., Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930)
(conceptualizing law as engine having purposes, not values in itself).
87. See Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399, 408-14 (1985).
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people make different (and mutually optimistic) predictions about the
probable outcome of a given process.8 8 In some measure, process agree-
ment suggests that most people value the use of certain procedures in
particular circumstances. 89
Judge Smith rightly notes that judges and lawyers often prefer
clearly specified forms of proceeding, many times trial-like procedures,
when popular consensus favors less formal, less structured, and less judi-
cial procedures. But specified procedures, and trial-type procedures in
particular, serve a function apart from making lawyers comfortable and
important: formal procedures operate as a brake on administrative dis-
cretion.90 There often is consensus, popular as well as legal, that formal
administrative process is advisable precisely because there is distrust of
administrators. The Defense Department contracting officers' hands are
tied by formal process requirements to prevent favoritism and corrup-
tion.91 So, too, distrust of police officers' unbridled discretion is the rea-
son these officials must secure warrants, give warnings, volunteer
information on rights to the accused, and so on.92
What Judge Smith overlooks in his attack on "proceduralism" is the
degree to which the mistrust so evident in these examples is endemic,
describing a general attitude toward administrative officials at all levels.
No one appreciates "red tape," the synonym for undue bureaucratic for-
malism. Few people, however, want to forsake a government of law in
88. A similar proposition lies at the heart of much recent work concerning litigants' decisions
to settle or try cases, the latter decision represented largely as the product of parties' optimism. See,
e-g., Cooter, Marks & Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic
Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982); Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
89. See, eg., J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALY-
sis (1975); Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REv.
885 (1981); Michelman, Formal and AssociationalAims in ProceduralDue Process, in NoMos XVIII:
DUE PROCESS 126 (J. Chapman & V. Pennock, eds. 1977); Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values:
Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 111 (1978); Sum-
mers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Values, " 60 CORNELL L. REv.
1 (1974).
90. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667,
1679-81, 1711-60 (1975); see also K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969) (exploring possibilities
for controlling, but preserving, administrative discretion).
91. Federal government contract regulations are described in R. NASH & J. CIBINIC, FEDERAL
PROCUREMENT LAW (3d ed. 1977). For a discussion of the general problem of corruption, see
Banfield, Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization, 18 J.L. & ECON. 587 (1975); Rot-
tenberg, Comment, 18 J.L. & ECON. 611 (1975) (commenting on Banfield, supra).
92. Various legal constraints on police behavior are discussed in Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (5th ed. 1980). See also A. REISS, THE POLICE AND THE
PUBLIC (1971); Banfield, supra note 91; Reder, Citizen Rights and the Cost of Law Enforcement, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 435 (1974) (economic analysis).
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favor of a government entirely "of men."'93 Judge Smith's confidence
that increased discretion in officialdom-legislative and administrative
alike-is preferable to increased, judicially monitored formalism typifies
the view of officials in power at any given time. Personal knowledge of
current officeholders' ability and integrity gives me little basis to differ
from Judge Smith's confidence. The procedures with which he is con-
cerned, however, seem to me the inevitable concomitant of a large bu-
reaucracy, not easily monitored, necessarily making each day thousands
of decisions as to which our divergent preferences provide no clear so-
cially preferred outcome. Just as our inability to agree on substance
often requires that administrative decisionmakers be given discretion or
no job at all,94 our distrust of the manner in which that discretion will be
exercised mandates procedural constraints on administrators. 95 One can,
of course, ask that administrative errors be corrected politically-by
changing administrations or by rewriting legislation. Both correctives,
however, are blunt instruments, ill-suited to the minutiae of administra-
tive life. Just as pimples may be cured by decapitation or attacked by
legislatively mandated cleansing procedures separately directed at each
blemish as it occurs, administrative error can be checked by blunt polit-
ical means. Yet, if pimples are the expected accompaniment of adoles-
cence and administrative errors the predictable by-product of
administrative discretion, general, modest procedural precautions seem
the more sensible approach to these problems.
93. The phrase "government of laws and not of men" is credited to John Adams, from MASS.
CONST. of 1780, Declaration of Rights, art. 30.
94. See R. CASS, REVOLUTION IN THE WASTELAND 42-43 (1981); Aranson, Gellhorn &
Robinson, supra note 43, at 57-62; Fiorina & Noll, Voters, Legislators and Bureaucracy: Institu.
tional Design in the Public Sector, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 256, 258-59 (1978) (as legislative programs
administered under delegations to agencies become subject to distributive politics, they become ob-
jects of political consensus rather than dispute); Mashaw, supra note 76, at 98-99 (broad delegations
can improve responsiveness to public interests).
95. The procedural constraints we impose, of course, need not take the form of trial-type proce-
dures. The Civil Service laws, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3397 (1982 & Supp. 111984), provide one important
process constraint (a system of competitive examination and certification to insure civil servant abil-
ity), that is clearly tied to disbelief that administrative officials' behavior (specifically, their personnel
decisions; but by implication also their substantive decisions) mirrors Congress's objectives. An-
other, different, sort of procedural constraint is illustrated by the Social Security Administration's
(SSA) "grid" system, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2 (1985) (mechanical four-variable test of
disability under Social Security Act), instituted as a mechanism for checking the discretion of
subordinate SSA officials. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1982); J. MASHAW, BUREAU-
CRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 49-168 (1983); Diver, The
Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65; 88-92 (1983).
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V. CONCLUSION
Viewed from this vantage, Judge Smith has seen, not the twilight of
administrative law, but merely the haze through which its rays must be
filtered. Courts can lose sight of the fact that other branches have impor-
tant roles in governance. Procedural concerns can deflect attention from
important substantive issues. These pathologies, however, should not be
taken as proof that the current judicial involvement and procedural ori-
entation in administrative law are undesirable. Consensus on substantive
issues is hard to come by. And that, in a nutshell, is why administrators,
judges, and formal procedures play the roles they now do.
